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Home Office
Deduction
Allowed for
University Professor
Second Circuit Reverses Tax Court

though unmarked, area that he used
exclusively and on a regular basis as
his home office.
In discussing the regular basis
requirement, the Senate Report4 indi
cated that a home office used only
occasionally or incidentally would not
be considered as used on a regular
basis. The proposed regulations do lit
tle to provide further guidance. Pro
posed Regulation Sec.280A-2(h) merely
states that the regular basis require
ment is decided in light of all the facts
and circumstances of the individual
case. The scant authority, however,
suggests that a taxpayer who estab
lishes a consistent pattern of behavior
in which the home office is an integral
part of his business activities, will
satisfy the regular basis requirement.
The principal place of business
requirement looks to the “focal point’’
of the taxpayer’s business activities.
The proposed regulations under
Sec.280A provide that:

By Chula G. Ensley

The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, has recently held in Weissman
v. Commissioner1 that, under some cir
cumstances, a university professor is
entitled to a home office deduction for
the working area in his apartment used
for university related activities. In so
holding, the Second Circuit reversed
a consistent Tax Court position that the
principal place of business, i.e., focal
point of the business activities, of a
university professor as specified in
Sec.280A(c)(1)(A) is the university
campus. While the Weissman decision
is relatively narrow in scope, many
university professors may benefit
therefrom.

Section 280A
Section 280A, enacted as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, generally dis
allows a deduction for office space
used within a dwelling unit which is the
employee-taxpayer ’s residence,
unless specifically excepted from this
section and otherwise allowable. An
exception to this disallowance is found
in Sec.280A(c) which provides that the
employee-taxpayer shall not be denied
a home office deduction if four condi
tions are met. First, the use of the por
tion of the dwelling unit serving as an
office must be exclusive. Second, the

use must be on a regular basis. Third,
the portion of the dwelling unit under
question must be the principal place of
business of the taxpayer. Finally, such
use must be for the convenience of the
employer.

The legislative history of Section
280A indicates that the exclusive use
test requires that the taxpayer’s use of
the portion of the dwelling unit be
solely for the purpose of carrying on
his trade or business. The Senate
Report indicated that using a room in
the house for both personal and busi
ness purposes would not satisfy the
exclusive use test.2 However, the Tax
Court in Weightman v. Commissioner3
found that a college professor who
used a portion of his bedroom as a
home office had satisfied the exclusive
use test even though such portion was
not physically separated from the rest
of the bedroom. In so holding the Tax
Court concluded that Sec.280A(c)
does not require a separate room or
some physically separated portion of
a separate room. However, the Court
indicated that without a wall, partition,
curtain or some other means of iden
tifying the business area, the taxpayer
may have more difficulty establishing
that there was in fact some separate,

When a taxpayer engages in a sin
gle trade or business at more than
one location, it is necessary to deter
mine the taxpayer’s principal place
of business for that trade or business
in light of all the facts and circum
stances. Among the facts and cir
cumstances to be taken into account
in making this determination are the
following:
(i) The portion of the total income
from the business which is attrib
utable to activities at each
location;
(ii) The amount of time spent in
activities related to that business
at each location; and
(iii) The facilities available to the tax
payer at each location for pur
poses of that business.5

Neither the legislative history of
Sec.280A, nor the proposed regula
tions thereunder shed much light on
the convenience of the employer
requirement. The legislative history
provides only that the deduction
attributable to the home office use will
be denied if such use is merely
appropriate and helpful. The Fourth
Circuit held in Bodzin6 that in order to
establish that the use of the home
office was for the convenience of the
employer, the taxpayer must show that
the office provided by the employer
was either not available at the time the
home office was used or not suitable
for the purpose for which the home
office was used.
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Weissman v. Commissioner
This case involves the question of
deductibility of a home office main
tained by David J. Weissman, an
associate professor of philosophy at
City College of the City of New York.
Professor Weissman was required not
only to teach, but also to conduct an
unspecified amount of research and
writing in his field in order to retain his
teaching position. Of the 64 to 75
hours per week Professor Weissman
spent engaged in his profession, only
14 to 15 hours per week or 20 percent
was actually spent on campus. The
remaining 80 percent of his working
hours was spent in an office main
tained in his ten-room apartment. The
on campus office provided Professor
Weissman by the university contained
no typewriter, was shared with several
other professors and was found by the
Tax Court to be an unsafe place to
leave his teaching, writing and
research related materials and equip
ment. Professor Weissman also had
access to the school library from 9:00
a.m. to 9:00 p.m. on weekdays. How
ever, the library provided no space for
typing manuscripts and no private
space in which to work.
Based upon the facts in the case,
the Tax Court accepted Weissman’s
argument that the office in his apart
ment was used exclusively and on a
regular basis for his employment
related activities of research and writ
ing. However, the Tax Court denied
Weissman’s argument that the home
office was the focal point of his busi
ness activities. In so concluding, the
Tax Court stated that:
We have uniformly held that the focal
point of those who teach (at both col
lege and secondary school levels) is
the educational institution rather than
the home office. While research and
writing was an important part of peti
tioner’s duties as an associate
professor, it does not shift the focal
point of his job away from City Col
lege where he taught, met with stu
dents, graded examinations, and
prepared lectures. This is so even
though petitioner spent more time
each week doing research and writ
ing at home than he spent in teach
ing and related activities at the
college.7

The Tax Court denied Weissman’s
argument that the maintenance of the
home office was for the convenience
of his employer. The Tax Court based
this opinion first on the fact that the
12/The Woman CPA, April, 1986

The Weissman decision
permits a home office
deduction for a University
professor who is required to
engage in research and
writing, spends the majority of
his working time doing so,
and is not provided adequate
on-campus office space for
these activities.

university bylaws did not require the
employee to maintain a home office
and secondly on the basis of testimony
of the assistant chairman of the philos
ophy department that the library could
have been used in some of Weiss
man’s research.
The Second Circuit, however,
rejected the Tax Court’s opinion that
Weissman not be allowed the home
office deduction because of failure to
meet the principal place of business
and convenience of employer tests.
In its opinion, the Second Circuit
questioned the Tax Court’s focal point
approach to determining a university
professor’s principal place of business.
In the case of educators, the focal
point approach does not always ade
quately
distinguish
between
individuals with very different
employment activities. No doubt
many college professors spend most
of their working hours teaching or
engaging in teaching-related activi
ties .... Some college professors,
however, spend the major share of
their working hours researching and
writing. Both types of employee have
earned the designation of "profes
sor,” but the title should not obscure
the differences between them. In this
case, the Tax Court focused too
much on Professor Weissman’s title
and too little on his activities.8

The Second Circuit cited Drucker v.
Commissioner9 in which the Court
used the following criteria to determine
the principal place of business: (1) the
nature of the business activities; (2) the
facilities needed to carry out such
activities; and (3) the practical neces
sity of using a home office.

In applying Drucker to the instant
case, the Second Circuit determined
that the nature of Professor Weiss
man’s business activities was 20 per
cent teaching related and 80 percent
research and writing related. The
research and writing related activities
required a place in which Professor
Weissman could read, think and write
without interruption. Since he was not
provided a private on campus office in
which to conduct the research and
writing activities, a home office was a
practical necessity. Thus, applying the
Drucker case along with the fact that
scholarly research and writing were
conditions of Professor Weissman’s
continued employment, the Second
Circuit concluded that the principal
place of business requirement was
met. In so concluding, the Court added
the following caveat:
In some circumstances the fact that
a professor spends a majority of his
working time in his home office will
not overcome the presumption that
an educator’s principal place of busi
ness is the college at which he
teaches.10

The Second Circuit likewise applied
the Drucker case in reviewing the
“convenience of the employer’’
requirement. In Drucker, the Court
concluded that this requirement had
been met because the appellants, who
were musicians, had not been pro
vided any space for the essential task
of private practice, and because the
expenses were not solely for personal
convenience, comfort, or economy.
Applying the Drucker standard, the
Court concluded the following:
The cost of maintaining his home
office was almost entirely additional
to nondeductible personal living
expenses because it was used exclu
sively for employment-related activi
ties and because such use was
necessary as a practical matter if
Professor Weissman was faithfully to
perform his employment duties. This
practical necessity negates any
claim that the office was used as a
matter of personal convenience
rather than for the convenience of
the employer. . . . The maintenance
of a home office was not a personal
preference of the employee; it
spared the employer the cost of
providing a suitable private office and
thereby served the convenience of
the employer.11

Unresolved Issues
The Weissman case leaves three
points unresolved: (1) Whether a lesser
quantity, i.e., less than 80 percent, of
working hours spent at the home office
would satisfy the principal place of
business requirement; (2) to what
extent, if any, the professor could use
the home office to engage in activities
for which adequate on campus facili
ties were provided, e.g., grading
papers; and (3) whether the presence
of all three factors of unsafe campus
conditions, lack of private office space
and lack of private library space were
required to establish the necessity of
a home office.

Application of Weissman
In General. The decision reached in
Weissman would permit the home
office deduction for a university profes
sor who (1) by conditions of his
employment, is required to engage in
scholarly research and writing, (2)
spends the majority of his working time
engaged in scholarly research and
writing, and (3) is not provided ade
quate on campus office space in which
to conduct scholarly research and
writing.
A percentage of the following deduc
tions is available to a professor who
maintains a home office: (1) deprecia
tion on the dwelling if the professor is
a home owner, or the rental payment;
(2) home mortgage interest; (3) real
estate taxes; (4) insurance; (5) utilities;
(6) alarm system; (7) telephone; (8)
cleaning expense; and (9) some types
of minor repairs. This percentage is
generally based on the ratio of the
square footage of the home office to
the square footage of the total dwell
ing. In addition, the following deduc
tions not requiring allocation are
available: (1) depreciation and invest
ment tax credit on furnishings and
equipment used in the home office; (2)
supplies; (3) painting home office
space; (4) office equipment repairs; (5)
new curtains/drapes in space used as
home office; (6) personal property
taxes on office equipment, furnishings
and equipment; and (7) other normal
office operating expenses.
Under Sec.280F of the Tax Reform
Act of 1984. Weissman may have
special significance to a university
professor when viewed within the con
text of Sec.280F, added by the Tax
Reform Act of 1984. Sec.280F gener
ally denies an employee a deduction

for and investment tax credit on cer
tain “listed” properties used for trade
or business purposes unless the use
is both for the convenience of the
employer and required as a condition
of employment.12 Included in the defi
nition of “listed” properties are com
puters and peripheral equipment, and
automobiles.
In most instances, a university
professor would have difficulty under
Sec.280F deducting the cost of a com
puter and peripheral equipment used
at home. However, Sec.280F(d)(4)(B)
excludes from the definition of “listed”
property any computer or peripheral
equipment used exclusively at a regu
lar business establishment. Such sec
tion treats the home office as a regular
business establishment if the require
ments of Sec.280A(c)(1) are met.
Therefore, a university professor who
is able to substantiate a home office
deduction under Sec.280A as outlined
in Weissman should be allowed a
depreciation deduction on and invest
ment credit for a computer and
peripheral equipment used therein.
Another significant deduction avail
able to the professor who maintains a
home office is the cost of commuting
between the home office and campus.
The Tax Court held in Curphey v.
Commissioner13 that a taxpayer may
deduct the transportation expenses
incurred in traveling between his home

and other business locations when the
taxpayer’s home is his principal place
of business with respect to those busi
ness activities. While the university
professor may or may not be denied
a depreciation deduction and invest
ment tax credit on his automobile
under Sec.280F, he should be entitled
to the standard mileage allowance for
travel between his home office and the
university campus if he qualifies for a
home office deduction under
Sec.280A(c)(1).

Substantiation of Home Office
Deduction
The university professor who is eligi
ble to take a home office deduction
should have adequate records for sub
stantiation thereof. These records
should contain the following:
1. A statement by the employer recit
ing scholarly research and writing
as a condition of continued employ
ment and promotion.
2. Documentation of on campus facil
ities for carrying out scholarly
research and writing to support
both the necessity of having a
home office and the convenience of
the employer requirement.
3. Documentation of the working
hours spent on campus and the
working hours spent in the home
office to support both the amount
of time and the use of the time at
both locations, to support the prin
cipal place of business require
ment, and to support the regular
use requirement.
4. Documentation of the furnishings of
the home office to support the
deductions thereon and the exclu
sive use requirement.
5. Documentation of all activities car
ried out in the home office to sup
port the exclusive use requirement.
6. Documentation to support the per
centage used for allocating those
deductions requiring allocation.

Conclusion

Chula G. Ensley, Ph.D., CPA, is
assistant professor, Department of
Finance and Accounting, at The Univer
sity of West Florida, Pensacola, Florida.
She received her Ph.D. in accounting
from Louisiana State University, Baton
Rouge and is a member of AWSCPA,
AICPA, FICPA, AAA and NTA-TIA.

Prior to the Second Circuit’s deci
sion in Weissman v. Commissioner,
university professors were generally
denied a home office deduction. Such
denial typically resulted from the Tax
Court’s finding that the principal place
of business activity of a university
professor is the university campus
rather than the home office. Weissman
more liberally applied this requirement
More on Page 18
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1981, $2.6 billion debt was resche
duled; in 1985 it may reach or exceed
$100 billion.
As long as the debtors can continue
borrowing enough to pay interest on
old loans, the merry-go-round con
tinues. When debtors begin faltering,
the recycling slows. Some worried cre
ditors, usually the least exposed, stop
throwing good money after bad.
Others are too involved to cut their
losses. If you owe the bank $1000 and
cannot pay, it is your problem. If you
owe the banks $300 billion and cannot
pay, the banks are in trouble. Consider
Citibank, for example. As the largest
U.S. bank, it has capital of $5.5 billion.
Citibank’s Brazilian loans alone
amount to $4.4 billion. Manufacturers
Hanover has $3.7 billion, 112 percent
of its net worth, tied up in loans to Bra
zil and Argentina. Chase Manhattan
also has $3.6 billion, or 92 percent of
its net worth, in loans to the same two
countries. The nine largest U.S. banks
together have $28 billion in capital, but
$64 billion in loans outstanding to trou
bled economies.1 One year of no
interest or principal payments from
Latin America would eliminate all
profits and most capital of these U.S.
banks. If Brazil, Argentina, and Mex
ico decided to join forces and repudi
ate their debts, the nine largest U.S.
banks would be wiped out.

Of course this will not happen.
Governments, both of debt troubled
countries and strong banking coun
tries, cannot allow the massive col
lapse of the international monetary
system this situation portends. Efforts
are being made by the International
Monetary Fund, groups of debtor
countries, and others to forestall each
confrontation between bank and
debtor country. The banks may come
out in the end solely because they are
too vital to let go under.
Whatever the ultimate resolution of
the crisis, it is obvious that the
accounting rules which allowed banks
to postpone recognizing economic
losses have had more negative than
positive economic consequences.
What would have happened given the
necessity to write down restructured
loans is impossible to reconstruct. But
in retrospect it is easy to believe that
the loan merry-go-round would have
slowed more gradually, with time for
the world economy to readjust, than
face the present fear of total collapse.

measure and report behavior, not
become the object of behavior. The
accounting principle should not
influence the economic decision, but
merely report it. The troubled debt
pronouncement is an unfortunate
example where all the negative factors
came into place at one time. The pri
mary arguments against recognizing
losses on restructuring were theoreti
cal consistency and the potential
effects on the economy. The resulting
statement is a model for inconsistency,
and has probably exacerbated the
largest financial crisis in history. The
FASB’s pronouncement provides
heavy fuel for those parties who
scorn the ability of business and
the accounting profession to regulate
themselves.Ω

NOTE
1Von Hoffman, Nicholas, The New Republic,
October 14, 1985, pp. 21-22.

Conclusion
Standard setting for financial report
ing is a complex process affected con
currently by the need to serve
numerous masters, maintain theoreti
cal consistency, and accommodate the
realities of the world economic struc
ture. Ideally, financial reporting should
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by looking to the nature of the business
activities, the attributes of the space in
which the business activities can be
carried out and the necessity of using
a home office to carry out such
activities.
While the Weissman decision is rela
tively narrow in scope, many university
professors may be able to apply their
factual situations thereto in substan
tiating a home office deduction.fi
NOTES
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